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CAUSES OF CHANGE IN CONSUMER SHOE BUYING
In our culture, almost anything can influence what,
when, and how much people buy. This hypothesis
has the unhappy attribute of being too general to use
and too complicated to test. The problem, therefore,
is to develop a more specific one.
Though all sorts of factors seem capable of shifting
the kinds and amounts of shoes that people buy, some
influences are certainly far stronger than others. If
they could be isolated, they would account for the
major outlines of change in aggregate shoe buying
from one time to another. In this context, a "strong"
factor is one capable of causing substantial changes
in aggregate shoe buying by virtue, first, of the strength
of its influence on individual shoe buying and second,
of the extent of its variation over time. By examining
such evidence as can be mustered and by testing, re-
vising, testing again, we select the strong factors. Thus
the final specific hypothesis is produced from the
empirical evidence.
The search for and test of the specific hypothesis
are long and painstaking. Much of the process involves
negative conclusions; much of it remains inconclusive.
This chapter does not trace the full course of the
search.' Instead, we concentrate on those factors that
were shown to influence the history of shoe buying
substantially during the period studied—1926 to 1941.
During this period (and the closest observations are
further confined to 1929 to 1941), the income that
people had to spend appeared to be the overpowering
determinant of spending on even the single commodity
group, shoes—though in addition shoes lost ground
over the years to the wealth of other goods and serv-
ices offered for sale. From sources other than time
series, however, there was evidence that many other
factors have the capacity to influence shoe buying—
the direction in which income has recently changed;
the distribution of income between rich and poor and
between farm and city families; the change in the
size and constitution of the population; and prices.
Nevertheless, the history of buying over the period
seemed quite well explained without explicitly taking
these factors into account. The same is true of factors
1SeeRuth P. Mack, Factors Influencing Consumption: An
Experimental Analysis of Shoe Buying, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Technical Paper 10, 1954.
which logic, though little evidence, suggests may be
important—expectations about future income and the
presence in consumers' closets of shoes that still re-
tained their usefulness.
But though a surprising proportion of all shoe buy-
ing can be explained by the current level of income
after adjustment for a downward trend,, much of the
sensitive month-to-month or quarter-to-quarter change
remains unexplained. Also, postwar changes in buy-
ing are not well explained by the same relationship
to income that explained prewar buying. This suggests
that the importance of income for the period studied
may have resulted from the extraordinarily powerful
changes that characterized consumers' income between
1929 and 1941. For this period, the other variables
often paralleled consumer income or followed straight-
line trends, and their more delicate contours were
partly absorbed by, and partly lost in, income's rugged
shapes. At other times this may not be the case. Con-
sequently, anyone who wants to apply the findings
of this study to other problems—the isolation of factors
underlying the buying of other goods or of shoes at
other times—should not confine himself to the sum-
maries concerning the influence of each variable that
are given in this chapter, but should examine the evi-
dence as it is developed and described in the technical
paper.
Influence of'AggregateIncome
What people buy of all goods or of any major good
is significantly influenced by the amount of money
they have to spend. Evidence of this appears in all
sorts of statistical data. The powerful influence of in-
come may be seen in the shoe buying of families hav-
ing different incomes: the higher family income, the
more money spent on shoes. The famous 1935—1936
consumer purchases study provided information on
the items of clothing bought by about 150 thousand
individuals.' Analysis indicates that if, for each in-
come class, the average family income is plotted on
2Thestudy was a Work Projects Administration project con-
ducted by the Bureau of Home Economics and the Bureau of
'Labor Statistics under the joint supervision of these agencies
and the National Resources Committee. The data cited in theCAUSES OF CONSUMER BUYING 61
one axis and shoe expenditure on the other, both on
logarithmic scales, a rise on the income scale of 1 per
cent was, at the point of average income, associated
with a rise of shoe expenditure of 0.75 per cent. We
may call this the average interfamily income elasticity
of shoe expenditure, though it is at best only a rough
approximation of even the concept, let alone the true
Further, it applies only to families having in-
comes in the lower and central ranges; for higher-
income families, elasticity seemed substantially less—
nearer 0.50.
Though it is not directly relevant to our problem,
one is curious to know how the interfamily income
elasticity of shoe buying compares with that of other
consumer goods. Table 21 answers the question in
a rough and tentative fashion. The figures given there
are derived in the same way and from the same source
material (the 1935—1936 survey of income and ex-
penditure) as the statistics for shoe expenditure. Be-
cause the table constitutes a digression, I present it
without comment. There is much in it to ponder.
INCOME AND SHOE BUYING IN CUBBENT DOLLARS
The influence of income on shoe expenditure like-
wise seems visible in monthly time series. In Chart 9,
shoe sales and disposable consumer income are shown,
and their movements may be compared from 1929
through 1941. We start in 1929 because it is only then
that monthly income payments became available; we
end in 1941 to avoid the disruptions that occurred dur-
ing the war period.
The chart pictures a slight downward trend in shoe
sales relative to income (the space between the two
lines grows smaller as time proceeds), a fact to which
we return later. The major business-cycle fluctuations
(the drop after the peak in 1929, the rise from 1933
to 1937, the short but marked drop in the latter half
of 1937 and beginning of 1938, and the rise thereafter)
appear clearly both in consumer income and in the
dollars spent on shoes.
The minor fluctuations apparent in shoe buying ap-
pear also in aggregate income payments. If all the in-
come from soldiers' bonus payments is included the
moment when the bonds were redeemed (the dotted
lines on the chart), both consumers' income and shoe
text, obtained during personal interviews, are based on tables in
Family Expenditures in the United States—Statistical Tables
and Appendixes, 1935—36 (National Resources Planning Board,
1941).
3Actually,many factors are correlated with family income—
family size, wealth, living standards, and even the recent dfrec-
lion of change in income; all these influences are inextricably
amalgamated in the data. The figure of 0.75 per cent is thus not
a pure interfamily income elasticity.
buying have small fluctuations at the same times,
except for the recession in 1939 when income payments
merely flatten. Further, they typically reach peaks
and troughs at very nearly the same time with no
systematic lead or lag. Seven of the thirteen matched
turns occur in the same month. The average deviation
from the mean of 0.4 month by which shoe sales, on
the average, lead income payments is ±1.0 month.
Of the 144 months from the beginning of 1929 to the
end of 1940, there are only 22 (15 per cent) when
shoes sales and income are not in matching specific-
subcycle phases, either because of a difference in the
month when peak and trough occurred or because, in
one case, of a missing phase in one of the
come.4 There appears to be no systematic difference
in timing.
41n 26, or 18 per eent, of the 144 months, the subcycle phases
for either shoe sales or income moved in the opposite direction
from the major cycle phase. These episodes were short—four
or five months. Though all but one of the six episodes were
TABLE 21


















































a Incomeelasticity is the percentage shift in expenditure asso-
ciated with a 1 per cent shift in family income. The measures are
based on Tables 1, 7, 9, 11, and 101 in Family Expenditures in
the United States, Statistical Tables and
(National Resources Planning Board, 1941). The elasticity co-
efficients are the slopes of straight lines fitted by inspection to
the regression of family expenditure of specified sorts on family
income, both plotted on a logarithmic scale.
b Elasticity seems characteristically to decrease as income
shifts upward, so that the figure given here does not apply to most
of the income range but only applies in the neighborhood of its
center.62 CHAPTER6
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The parallelism in shoe buying and personal income
can be studied further in Chart 10, where monthly
first differences in each are depicted smoothed by
a centered five-month average. The chart also shows
the unsmoothed monthly data for income payments;
because of the far broader base and the diversity of
components for the income series, these probably
afford the more appropriate comparison for smoothed
shoe sales; Except for some confusion in the neighbor-
hood of the two bonus payments, rates of change in
shoe buying seem to respond with considerable sensi-
tivity to rates of change in consumer income. Change
in income leads sales by 0.4 month, on the average,
with an average deviation of 1.4 months for the fifteen
matched turns. Nineteen per cent of the months, a very
low figure for first difference series, are in unlike sub-
cyclical phase.
Study of these charts raises a question: though shoe
sales and income have, by and large, the same minor
movements at roughly the same time, the minor move-
ments of shoe sales seem to have a somewhat larger
amplitude, relative to the major swings, than have
those of income payments. To study this matter, first
the specific amplitude of all subcycles was computed
and then the amplitude of movements associated with
the four major turns (plus the two incomplete terminal
marked for income as well as shoe sales, they were typically
shorter in the former series. For income payments, 12 months
were in contracycle subcyclical phase, and during all but 3 of
these, shoe sales were in like phase. For shoe sales, 24 months
were in contracycle subcyclical phase, and during 15 of these,
income payments (largely because of the shorter movements)
were in opposite subcyclical phase.
expansion phases) that took place between 1929 and
For shoe sales, the major movements contributed
79 per cent of the total fluctuation of major and minor
ones in sequence. For income payments, with the
soldiers' bonuses of March 1981 and June 1986 dis-
tributed over the next nine months, the corresponding
figure was 98 per cent. This means 'that the minor
movements that interrupt the major swings were, for
income payments, primarily flattened areas or slanted
banks, as the chart suggests.
But the contrast in the two percentage figures, 79
and 98, certainly overstates the relative importance
of major and minor movements in consumer buying of
shoes compared with those of income receipts. The
difficulty rests in technical characteristics of the time
series. Virtually of necessity, the shoe-sales series has
a large erratic component not possessed to anything
like the same degree by a complex aggregate like in-
come payments.° The amplitude measures fasten on ab-
solute highs and lows regardless of what caused them.
Erratic components at peaks and troughs influence the
amplitude of subcycles more than that of major move-
ments, if only because more subcycles are included.
But insofar as the amplitude measures for shoe sales
are influenced by technical factors not present in the
income data—the whimsies of small samples, the diffi-
For a description of how specific-cycle amplitudes are com-
puted, see Appendix A, sec. 16.
6Incomepayments are the sum of an enormous number of
diverse series, which lose much of whatever erratic character
they may have in the process of summation. Further, something
in the order of 15 per cent of total income payments were, at
least for the earlier years for which they were computed, ob-
tained by arithmetic interpolation of annual data.
192919301931 1932193319341935193619371938193919401941




Monthly FirstDifferences in Shoe Sales and in Personal Income
Payments,1929—1941
Percent
Specific-subcycle turns are marked by 0.
The series are expressed as percentages of monthly shoe soles (31) or income payments (125),
averaged for 1929—1941. The moving overages ore of month-to-month change and ore
centered.
culty of adjusting properly for very heavy seasonal
patterns, the influence of weather and special promo-
tions, to mention a few—it would be desirable to
reduce the erratic component of shoe sales. To this
end, the data were smoothed mechanically by apply-
ing a five-month moving average.7 The major move-
ments are found to constitute 87 per cent of total sub-
cyclical amplitude for the moving average of sales
and 95 per cent for the month-to-month personal in-
come payments.
This means that even after an attempt to make the
erratic components of the two series more comparable,
income payments seem to bear a different relation to
major movements in shoe sales than to minor ones.
The extent of the difference (if one ignores differences
in calculating amplitude measures, peak and trough stand-
ings are simply single peak and trough months in the five-month
average for shoe sales and single peak and trough months in the
monthly data on income payments.
in timing) can be roughly indicated by dividing the
per month amplitude for shoe sales (already expressed
as a percentage of the average standing of the Series)
by that of income payments. For all subcycles it is
1.19/1.23, or 0.97; for major specific cycles (those as-
sociated with reference cycles)itis1.05/1.17, or
0.90; for only the four countercycle subcydical phases
it is 0.71/0.38, or 1.87. In other words, shoe sales vary
a little less than proportionately to income during
major movements and almost twice as much during
the minor movements that interrupt the major busi-
ness swings. Differences of this order are likely to
be meaningful. Furthermore, examination of the esti-
mates of shoe sales reported in the appendix to the
technical paper indicates that there is no reason to be-
lieve that they overplay the minor fluctuations in
actual shoe sales relative to the major ones. This indica-
tion that fluctuations in aggregate shoe buying are not
entirely explained by a uniform relation to changes in
1929193019311932193319341935 19371938193919401941
No veterans' bonus adje
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aggregate consumer income spurs the search for other
factors that might explain the differences.
INCOMEAND SHOEBUYINGADJUSTEDFOR PRICE CHANGE
Theoretically, consumer income in current dollars
may be converted to real income by adjusting for the
change in the quantity of consumer goods that the
dollar can buy; similarly, shoe sales may be adjusted
for the change in price of a group of identical shoes.
Actually, there are all sorts of practical problems in-
volved in both deflations, so that practice and theory
may differ substantially. Nevertheless, the operations
were performed as well as might be, and the two series
(income deflated by the cost of living and shoe sales
in standardized pairs) may be compared in the same
fashion as has just been done for the data in current
dollars. In general, virtually everything that has been
said about the cyclical and subcyclical parallelism be-
tween income and shoe buying applies to the series
in constant prices also.
Actual pair sales (shoe sales deflated by a price
series that purports to show the average price paid by
consumers for all shoes bought each month) show the
same major and minor movements that appear in the
data in current dollars or in standardized pairs. How-
ever, the major downward swing in the early thirties
and the upward sweep thereafter are greatly muted.
When income falls—and this was particularly marked
during the severe depression of the early thirties—con-
sumers tend to shift to cheaper grades of shoes. Con-
versely, when income rises, they tend to trade up—to
buy better shoes. This tendency to trade up or trade
down means that rising or falling income affects not
only the proportion that will be spent on shoes but
what sorts of shoes will be bought. There is, in other
words, a quantity-quality dimension of choice as well
as an allocation-of-dollar-income dimension. This phe-
nomenon can be seen in a very interesting way in
family budget surveys.
•From the 1935—1936 survey one can obtain informa-
tion about the number of pairs of shoes bought in a
year and the average price paid per pair by husbands
and wives, and the two together, in families classified
by income level. The data appear in Chart 11. They
were obtained by consolidating information published
separately for twelve different areas.8
8Thefigures are simple averages for eight urban and four
rural nonfarm areas for which detailed information on clothing
purchases was obtained in the 1935—1936 study. For the eight
urban areas, data are in Study of Consumer Purchases, Family
Expenditures in Selected Cities, J935—36 (Vol. III, Clothing and
Personal Care, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. 648, 1941, Table
5, pp. 256 if.). For the four rural nonfarm areas, data are in
The upper section shows the total expenditure on
shoes by husbands, wives, and the two together, by
family income level. The numerals designate the suc-
cessive income classes for which data are averaged;
for example, class 2, having an average income (read-
ing on the horizontal axis) of $758, includes families
with incomes between $500 and $1,000. The lower
section shows how shifts both in the price paid per
shoe (vertical axis) and in the number of shoes bought
(horizontal axis) contribute to the changes, income
level by income level, in total shoe buying. Each
observation that is plotted represents information for
one of the seven income groups. They can be identi-
fied on the upper section by their numbers. As the line
moves up and to the right, it indicates that a higher
price per pair was paid and more pairs were bought
as income shifted upward. Ignoring the two open-end
income classes—i and 7—the number of pairs bought
by husband and wife together increased from three
to just under five, and the average price paid from
about $3.00 to $5.50 as family income shifted from
$500 to $5,000, although virtually all of the price shift
occurred after the $1,500 level.
Several differences between husbands' and wives'
buying are brought out in the chart. These are in-
teresting since they probably bear on the general ques-
tion of the impact of style on spending. In the upper
section, we find that wives' expenditures both are
higher and have greater interfamily income elasticity
than those of husbands (the line is steeper). In the
lower section we see that the additional options
afforded above the $1,000 family income level (groups
3—7) take the form for husbands primarily of buying
higher-priced shoes; for women, the drive to buy more
pairs of shoes continues to persist along with the wish
for better pairs. It is this desire to buy perhaps blue
shoes, red shoes, and brown shoes, evening shoes, day
shoes, and sport shoes that accounts for the higher
absolute level and income sensitivity of wives' shoe
buying and, perhaps, also for the lower average price
paid by wives at each income level. These data sug-
gest that were consumer income to be higher in one
year than in another and were reactions to an altera-
tion in income broadly to follow interfamily quantity-
price characteristics, the average price that individu-
als would pay for shoes would also be higher in the
second year. This higher price would, on the average,
be paid even had there been no change in the price
of a shoe of identical quality and no change in tastes
or industry offerings.
Consumer Purchases Study, Family Expenditures for Clothing.
Five Regions (M. Y. Pennell et al, Dept. of Agriculture, Misc.
Pub. 422, 1941, Table 36, pp. 274 if.).CAUSES OF CONSUMER BUYING
CHART11
Expenditure on Footwear, Price Paid, and Quantity Purchased by
Husbands and Wives at Seven Income Levels, 1935—1936
Expenditures on Footwear, by Income Level





We have learned in no uncertain terms that shoe
buying fluctuates over the years in response to fluctua-
lions in the amount of money received by individuals.
The extent of the response is a question to which
multivariate analysis of time series might be expected
to give an answer. But before the method can be profit-
ably applied, it is important to learn what variables
other than income should be taken into account. This
knowledge is not easy to come by. The effort to acquire
it is described in the technical paper. Though some
of the variables studied were included in preliminary
regression equations, none of them appeared to have
significant identifiable influences in the actual history
of shoe buying, 1929—1941 with the, exception of price
and trend. Consumers may spend lessmoneyshoes
the more expensive shoesare judged to be relative to
other things that can be bought. Toapproximate this
factor roughly, the retail-shoe price indexwas divided
by the cost of living. It was found thatconsumers spent
less money for shoes in the late thirties thanthey did
in the early twenties in spite ofan increase in real in-
come, so that the presence of a time trend is indi-
cated.
These two factors—relative price and trendtogether
with aggregate consumer disposable income,were in-
troduced into a multiple correlation analysisin which
they were the independent variables andshoe sales
the dependent one. This method yieldedin effect a
system of weights for combining these various influ-
ences in such a fashion as to reproduce actual shoe
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sales, 1929—1941, as nearly as possible. However, the
computation was confined in certain ways: a straight-
line formula was used, so that a change of one unit
in any of the explanatory factors must always account
for a uniform amount of change in shoe sales;' also
'There seems little indication that some other formula would
be preferable for the period covered, and this one is the simplest
to apply. It would nevertheless have been desirable to test
other sorts of relationships, particularly for the income variable,
but this was not done.
a least-squares requirement was imposed; finally, the
model was incomplete—it was necessary to ignore
changes in supply and its possible influence on shoe
sales as well as the influence of purchases of commodi-
ties other than shoes. Table 22 indicates the computa-
tions and summarizes their results. Obviously, the
measurements are at best very rough approximations
that apply only to the period for which there is reason
tosuppose that structural relationships remained
TABLE 22
Information Concerning Estimates of Shoe SaTes Yielded by Multiple Correlation Analysis, 1929—1941
a Summationsof monthly data (series 31 in Appendix B). Per
capita figures are for individuals over two years old. Deflation is
effected by the index of the retail price of staple shoes (series 8)
put on a base of average prices in 1935—1939.
•b Monthly data (series 81) smoothed by a five-month moving
average; "unsmoothed" is, simply, monthly data (series 31).
•C Average value of shoe sales is in the units given in the column
headings.
d Regression coefficients are in units which when multiplied by
the series to which they apply (see notes e, f, and g below) yield.
products that, together, sum to shoe sales in the units given in
the column headings.
aIncomeis in units analogous to those given for shoe sales in
the column headings—annual figures (columns 1—4) or monthly
figures at annual rates (columns 5—7), aggregate (columns 4—7)
or per individual over two years of age (columns 1—3), current
dollars (columns 2—7) or deflated by the cost of living on a
1935—1989 base (column 1). The basic data are the personal
income series of the Department of Commerce (July 1947 re-
vision) converted by the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search to civilian disposable income (with the soldiers' bonuses
of March 1931 and June 1936 distributed over the next nine
months; series 126).
Retail price of staple shoes (series 8) divided by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics index of living costs for the urban worker
series 124).
gAnnualdata; one unit per year, cumulating with negative
signs before, and positive signs after, 1985; monthly data: one-
twelfth the increments, origin in January 1935.
h At average values for all variables, the coefficients give the
percentage change in the dependent variable associated with a 1
per cent change in each independent variable.
1 fl-coefficients give the proportion of the standard deviation
of shoe sales that is "explained" by the standard deviation times
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PER CAPITA: IN BILLS:
DEFLATEDCURRENTCURRENTCURRENT
Two Variables Three Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average value of shoe sales C $10.00 $10.12 $10.12 $1.24 $1.243 $1.243 $1.243
Coefficient of multiple correlation
Standard error of estimate, percentage of
average sales
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stable; this would certainly exclude the volcanic erup-
tions of the war period and thereafter.
Before the time-consuming monthly analyses were
undertaken, experiments were tried with annual data
(columns 1—4). In two of the calculations using
monthly data, shoe sales were smoothed by a five-
month moving average; but one set of computations
was done for the monthly figures themselves (column
7). The smoothing was predicated on a lack of con-
fidence in the seasonal correction and on the knowl-
edge that many factors, such as weather or catchy
styles, could cause monthly ups and downs, with com-
pensating downs and ups in neighboring months, and
would in any event not be explained by the same fac-
tors that accounted for sales for a season—the influ-
ences that the analysis might hope to measure.
All the measures of explanatory power and reliabil-
ity are very high. Even for the unsmoothed monthly
data, the multiple correlation coefficient is .98, whereas
for the others it is over .99.'° As the standard errors in
the third line of Table 22 show, very respectable
guesses could have been made about the value of shoe
sales for 1929 to 1941 had disposable personal income,
relative shoe price, and the equation relating them
been known.
Table 23 supplements the average measures with
semester-by-semester estimates. They are quite satis-
factory; they average within 1.2 per cent ofactual
figure for each six-month period. Moreover, change
from semester to semester is estimated within 30 per
cent, on the average, of the correct figure. Not only
are the signs correct in all but three of the twenty-five
cases, but if the amount of change for actual and esti-
mated sales is ranked, the two sets of figures have rank
correlation coefficients of .96.11Themonthly estimates
also reproduce the pattern of shoe sales with fidelity.
This can be seen at a glance in Chart 12, which is a
graphic presentation of the equation for column 6 of
Table 22. Not only the major but most of the minor
movements appear in the estimated series. Turns oc-
cur very close indeed to those of actual shoe sales with
virtually no systematic lead or lag.
Although it is interesting and useful to achieve an
adequate reproduction of shoe sales for a given period
—perhaps primarily useful for the dignity with which
it endows our construct of shoe sales itself—the chief
contribution is the analytic value of the calculation.
Chart 12 displays graphically the statement of the
correlation analysis on the contribution of each of the
variables. This knowledge may be profitably combined
11Forannual data, the signs are correct in all cases and the
ranks virtually identical. Change averages 8 per cent of the
correct figure. For sales proper, there is as much as a 1 per cent
error in only three years.
10 The reliability measures for the multiple correlation and
for parameters are useful for comparisons within each class of
computation; they need to be taken with more than a grain of
salt in view of the questionable applicability of many of the
theoretical propositions on which they are based. The serial as-
sociation of sequential observations in most time series is dis-
turbing here as elsewhere; in the smoothed data, such correlation
Is artificially imposed and the reliability measures are therefore
certainly too high. Examination of the residuals for autocorrela-
tion, using the mean-square successive-difference test, shows no
reason to reject the hypothesis that those for the annual or indi-
vidual month calculations are uncorrelated, though, as I have
said, I hesitate to base much reliance on tests of these data based
on probability theory. Of course, when we introduce serial cor-
relation in the dependent variable by a moving average, the
error term is likely to show autocorrelation, and this the tests
show to be the case.
Actual and Estimated Shoe Sales
TABLE 23
and Their Change, by Six-Month Periods, 1929—1941
(dollars in millions)























































































































(continued on next page)68 CHAPTER 6
TABLE 28 (continued)
(dollars in millions)
with information about the three variables—as well as
about others—gleaned from area surveys and other
sources.
Quantitative Impact of Income on Shoe Buying
The primary determinant of what people spend on
shoes is the money they have to spend. Perhaps the
best way to appreciate the importance of the income
parameter for the period 1929 to 1941 is to see in
Chart 12 and in Table 22 its contribution to the ex-
planation of shoe sales.
When consumers got more income, they spent a
certain proportion of the increment on shoes—around
1.6 or 1.7 per cent for the period studied; a reduction
in income caused a comparable decline in the buying
of even this single commodity. An alternative way of
describing the relation—and we really do not know
which is the more accurate—is that a 1 per cent
change in income was associated with a change of 0.8
or 0.9 per cent in shoe buying.'2
12Ascalculated, this figure applies only at average values for
shoe sales and income. We did not experiment with other
formulae, so there is no way of being sure that the uniform in-
cremental relationship is really the most stable one. The income
elasticity of shoe buying for, say, column 5 of Table 22 is 0.89
Income elasticity based on time series may be com-
pared very gingerly with an estimate based on area
surveys. An interfamily income elasticity of shoe buy-
ing of 0.75 at average family income was suggested
by the 1935—1936 income and expenditure study. Ob-
viously, this figure could be at best highly approxi-
mate. But even if trustworthy, correspondence with
the statistic on elasticity derived from time series
would not constitute a simple verification of either,
for the two figures are not directly comparable. We
know that the size of a family is correlated with in-
come in budget studies and strongly suspect that per-
centage expenditure on shoes increases with the num-
ber of feet requiring them. Thus the pure interfamily
income elasticity is probably lower than the net 0.75
that the budget data show, assuming the figure is the
result of accurate reports on shoe buying by a repre-
sentative sample. But it may well not be. The survey
data on shoe buying are obtained by itemizing and
at the average value as shown for the elasticity coefficient for
income; were it computed, by means of our regression equation,
for December 1941 when income was at its peak and shoe sales
at the figure for that month, it would have been 0.97; the cor-
responding figure at the lowest value, in March 1933, was 0.84.
Had a logarithmic equation been used, elasticity would have
been constant throughout.





















585.8 542.6 —7.3 +27.817+25.118 +2.7
553.2 561.8 —8.6 ±17.914+19.214 —1.8
596.8 582.9 +13.9 +43.621+21.117 +22.5





































































































Average error as per cent of
average actual value
Correlation coefficient for
ranks in columns 5 and 7
a Series31 in Appendix B.
b Estimated by income, time, and price (see Table 22, column 6).
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CHART12
Contribution of Each of Three Variables to the Estimation of Shoe
Sales, 1929—1 941
summing the purchases that each individual made.
The probability of forgetting items must increase with
the scale of living and the complexity of family struc-
ture. If this is the case, the true interfamily income
elasticity may be higher than Ø•75•13Theelasticity fig-
's One cannot put this proposition to a test, but for whatever
it is worth I calculate that an estimate of aggregate shoe buying
for 1935 to 1936 built up from the area surveys gives a lower
figure ($938 million) than that based on these time series
($1,156 million). This could of course also mean not that
the interfamily income regression was too flat but merely that
underreporting was found throughout the range. The estimate of
$988 million was made in this way: The proportion of clothing
ure based on time series, though not subject to the
same shortcomings, is subject to others. Adjustment
for some of the factors absorbed in the income param-
expenditure composed of footwear was calculated for families
at the seven income levels for which data are published in
Family Expenditures in the United States (Table 9, p. 4). These
ratios were then applied to the aggregate expenditure on cloth-
ing of families and single individuals, income level by income
level, as published in Consumer Expenditures in United
States (National Resources Committee, 1939, Table 31A, p. 89).
Expenditures on shoes by institutional residents were added;
they were estimated by applying the clothing-shoe expenditure
ratio for low income families to data from Table 12 (ibid., p.
63).
Mtllions of dollars per month
Source: Table 22, col. 6 and Appendix B.70 CHAPTER 6
eter, such as income distribution and expectations,
might lower the figure; adjustment for others, consum-
ers' stock for example, might raise it. Close comparison,
then, between the estimates of income elasticity of
shoe buying based on cross section studies and on time
series must be resisted, both because neither are suf-
ficiently accurate measures of those factors whiéh they
reflect, and because they do not reflect all of the same
factors. At least this much may be said: comparison
of the two elasticity figures does not actually indi-
cate inconsistency in the pure income-elasticity meas-
urement after allowances are made for bias that may
well be present.
Comparing the income elasticity based on regression
analysis with the crude computations in which meas-
ures of subcycical amplitude were used, the upper
figure from the equations and the elasticity estimate
for major (not minor) waves are both about
The reduction in shoe buying when income falls has
two components—a reduction in the number of pairs
bought and shifts from higher- to lower-priced pairs.
When income rises, the opposite two changes occur.
Alternate trading down and trading up seems espe-
cially characteristic of women's shoe buying. Retail-
ers report this phenomenon, and evidence of it ap-
pears in both time series and area surveys.
As between expansions and contractions, no ma-
terial difference appeared in the marginal propensity
to consume shoes. Such factors as might bring this
about—for example, the negative association of shoe
buying with the direction of change in income and
the positive association with income distribution and
expectations—tend to counteract one another for this
commodity. The average (as contrasted with themar-
ginal or incremental) relation between income and
shoe buying does seem to have a cyclical pattern: it
is somewhat higher in bad than in good years, that is,
the proportion of income spent on shoes tends to de-
cline as income rises.'5
Long-Term Trends
The second most important factor in explaining vari-
ation in shoe sales, 1929—1941, is time, as the beta (/3)
14 See page 63 and Table 22. It is reasonable that theregres-
sion coefficients should reflect the association during the strong
movements.
This can be seen by simply contrasting theaverage ratio of
sales to income for the peak years of 1929, 1937, and 1941 with
that for the trough years of 1932, 1933, and 1938. Theyare 1.81
and 1.95 respectively for dollar, and 1.86 and 2.04 for deflated,
figures.
It could also be deduced from the equation. When the
constant and the minimum value of the price ratio (not its
change, which operates in effect as a constant in the equation)
are jointly considered, the Y-intercept is positive in all years
coefficients in Table 22 indicate. Shoe sales have been
subject to a marked downward trend amounting to
around 1.5 per cent per year, other things separately
accounted for.'6
This omnibus figure includes all sorts of influences
each of which impelled in one direction over time,
though not each in the same direction; they did not,
of course, necessarily bear a stable relationship to
one another or even actually follow the straight-line
principle implied by the equation. The sorts of factors
involved were discussed in the previous chapter. The
more important contributors to the downward trend
were probably the ever-increasing assortment of goods
and services offered to consumers, increasing urbaniza-
tion, and an aging population; only partly counteract-
ing this influence was the upward impact of the im-
proved product offered by the industry, the added
emphasis on style, the trend toward a more even dis-
tribution of income that set in around the end of
the twenties, and the ever-increasing number of feet
to be shod.
Of the many factors that contribute to the net change
over time, very little of a quantitative nature can be
said. Area surveys suggest that shoe buying is more
strongly influenced by the size of the population than
most buying, other things (including income) the
same. The regression equations suggest this too. They
seem to indicate that per capita figures overcompen-
sate and aggregate figures undercompensate for the
influence of the number of people in the country.17
The per capita statistics appear to provide a slightly
more comprehensive explanation of aggregate shoe
buying and thus suggest that per capita relationships
may be more stable than aggregate relationships in-
cluding a trend factor. Certainly when change in
population does not follow substantially a straight-line
trend, as when data for the twenties and thirties are
combined or when the postwar period is included,
changes in population ought to be taken into account
even after the downward trend is allowed for. The incidence of
the other factors is not systematic with respect to major peaks
and troughs.
16 The size of this figure is associated with the price variable
for, as we noted, the price ratio had an upward trend. Conse-
quently, for current dollars the trend is smaller when price is not
included—around 1.0 per cent a year. For deflated figures, for
which the price ratio has a negative coefficient, it is smaller
when price is included.
"I refer to the fact that the downward trend was less in
aggregate than per capita figures. The reduction is probably
not statistically significant, but it conforms to the thesis that
shoe buying is less when population is small than when it is
large; population increases over the years; consequently, ag-
gregate shoe buying should also increase, ceteris paribus; and,
consequently, the downward trend shown in the statistics has
been moderated. For the per capita figures, the opposite argu-
ment applies. Area surveys support the notion since per capita
shoe sales are less for larger than for smaller families.explicitly.18 For other reasons, too, both analysis of
the several contributory factors and the evidence of
the time series suggest that the net trend for 1929 to
1941 would not necessarily apply to other times.19
Price
The regression analysis seems to support the familiar
and reasonable notion that people buy more shoes,
ceteris paribus, when they feel that the price of the
article is relatively low compared with the prices of
other things they might buy. The variable used to ex-
press this tendency was the price of a comparatively
18 When equations in columns 3 and 4 of Table 22 are pro-
jected for 1928 to 1928 and 1946 to 1949 inclusive, the error
is less for the per capita than for aggregate figures in virtually
every year. For the early group of years, the error of estimate
as a percentage of average shoe sales averaged 2.5 and 3.0,
respectively, for the per capita and data; for the
four postwar years the corresponding figures were 8.2 and 7.2
per cent, respectively. The best way to account for the popula-
tion factor would probably be to use per capita figures and
population as an additional variable.
If the equations are used to compute shoe sales in 1926,
1927, and 1928, the error of estimate is positive and increases
progressively from 1926 to 1928. If the trend variable is simply
dropped in the projection, most of the error in estimating sales
for 1926 to 1928 on the basis of the 1929—1941 relation is
eliminated. In postwar years, too, the error of estimate has a
trend—it goes from plus in 1946 to minus in 1949. For this
span of four years too, estimates would be slightly improved by
dropping the trend variable, though the statement does not
apply to the interveinng 1941—1948 period. But so much else
changed over these years that these facts are not very meaning-
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stable and unchanged group of shoes divided by an
index of the cost of living.2° Multiple correlations all
improve when price is added.2' The same thing may
be seen in Chart 13, where errors of estimate (actual
minus estimated sales) are plotted, first when the in-
dependent variables are income and time alone, and
second when relative price is included. Allowing for
the influence of price rids the error term of some of
its cumulative swings.
However, inspection of Chart 12 reveals grounds
for uneasiness. We see there that the price variable
jumped vigorously during the days of the National
20 Richard Stone has used each of these two prices separately
in correlation analysis rather than the ratio between the two,
believing that consumers may under some conditions be more
or less sensitive to changes in a specffic price than to the buyin
power of money. This seems to me to be altogether soun
procedure, providing the price histories are sufficiently different
to give adequately reliable separate coefficients. I have not fol-
lowed it because I have tried to economize variables introduced
in the correlation analysis. Besides, Stone's findings suggest
that shoes might well be a type of product for which a simple
ratio between particular and general prices provide a
approximation to consumers' reactions (see his article, 'The
Analysis of Market Demand," Journel of theRoyalStatistical
Society, Vol. CVIII, Parts III and IV, 1945).
21 Statistical measures of the improvements achieved through
the addition of the price variable appear in Table 22 in the
slightly increased coefficient of multiple correlation and de-
creased standard errors when column 1 is compared with col-
umn 3, and 5 with 6. The fact that the coefficient of price was
four or five times its standard error—the absolute level of this
figure for the smoothed monthly data in column 6 is certainly
too high—is perhaps further evidence in favor of the relevance




Broken and solid vertical lines identify specific-subcycle peaks and troughs in dollar shoe sales
(series 31 in Appendix B).
See Table 22, columns 5 and 6, for the regression equations.
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Recovery Administration, when shoe prices appar-
ently rose more than other living costs; for the rest of
the time the prices of shoes and other consumer goods
tended to change proportionately, and consequently
the ratio remained fairly stable. This means that there
was really only one short period in which the behavior
of the ratio was distinctive. For the rest, it was, in
effect, two broken, almost horizontal lines, the later
one higher than the earlier one. To make matters
worse, when relative (and absolute) shoe prices are
changing sharply, the reaction of consumers to price
could well be different per unit of price change than
when change is slight. Further, in the calculations,
reaction to price change may be confounded with the
trend parameter; we noted that the trend coefficient
shifted when price was added.
For these reasons we view the actual coefficient of
relative price with some suspicion. For whatever it
may be worth, however, we learn from Table 22 that
when the monthly equations are phrased in current
dollars, shoe sales rose around 0.4 per cent when the
price ratio rose 1 per cent. This means that the price
elasticity of demand in physical units as conventionally
stated was inelastic; dollar value of shoe buying rose
when prices rose—physical volume fell, roughly, by
0.6 per cent (0.41.0)as prices rose 1 per cent.
This calculation made in a preliminary form directly
on an annual per capita deflated basis shows a still
more inelastic reaction.22
Other Factors
Income, time, and price account for a substantial
portion of the history of shoe buying between 1929
and 1941. Nevertheless, a glance at the difference be-
tween actual sales and those estimated by the three-
variable equation (Chart 13, second line) indicates
that by no means all of the smoothed month-by-month
course of shoe buying, 1929 to 1941, is explained by a
straight-line relationship to these variables.Is the
pattern of the error term reminiscent of the course of
factors that previous study has suggested might help to
condition consumer buying? To aid in answering the
22 Elasticity of quantity with respect to price is approximately
equivalent to elasticity of dollar value with respect to price
minus one, though a calculation in current prices with price
as an additional variable suffers from a technical deficiency of
including prices twice. But this is certainly a very minor ob-
jection (see, for example Stone's interesting point mentioned
in note 20, above).
A pair of calculations was made in which change in income
was also included, one in current and the other in deflated
figures, directly comparable in other respects. Price elasticity
for the dollar calculation is 0.664. Subtracting one yields a
conventional elasticity figure of —0.386. The direct calculation
from deflated data shows price elasticity of —0.285 (cf. Mack,
op. cit., Table 7).
question, the error term is replotted in Chart 14,
where it may be compared with other time series.
First, the chart brings out that the estimating for-
mula shares a common attribute of most efforts to
explain buying: it underestimates rates of change in
buying. Comparing the errors with first differences in
sales, we see that when shoe buying was accumulating
momentum in a rise or fall, the explanatory series
often fails to account for the full impetus of the
change; this was especially clear in connection with
the rise at the beginning of 1931 and the several fluc-
tuations in 1938, 1934, 1935, and 1938, though it oc-
curred at other times also. The first line, column 7, of
Table 24 indicates that change insales and the
residuals were in like subcydical phase 70 per cent
of the time. This result was foreshadowed earlier when
the income elasticity of shoe buying seemed, on the
basis of measures of amplitude of both sorts of move-
ment, about half again as high for minor movements
as for major ones.23 There is no reason to attribute this
result to economically meaningless eccentricities of
the shoe-sales index. Careful examination of the index,
of its components, and of other relevant data 24 led
to the conclusion that most of the minor movements
in shoe buying were probably at least as reliably por-
trayed as the major ones. Their.patterns therefore de-
mand explanation.
The answers might be. found in the influences of
the direction and the rate of change in income, shifts
in income distribution, changing expectations, and,
perhaps, previous holdings of shoes. Of course, a large
part of such influences would be taken account of im-
plicitly in the correlation of their time patterns with
the influence of trend or of income. But to make mat-
ters worse, it is hard to find a time series capable of
quantitative representation of the part not so ac-
counted for. Chart 14 reveals another difficulty—
efforts to achieve such representations yield series that
are highly correlated among themselves. The second
section of Table 24 supports the visual impression.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that some of these
variables may be important, especially at times when
changes in the level of income are less domineering
than they were between 1929 and 1941. Because of
this potential future importance it is worthwhile to
spend a few moments canvassing what we do and
do not know about them. The statements are based
on investigations described in the technical paper.
CHANGES IN INCOME AND EXPECTATIONS
The impact of income on buying may be a function
not only of the level of income but also of the direc-
23 Cf. supra, p. 63.
24 Mack, op. cit., Appendix, Part II.CAUSES OF CONSUMER BUYiNG 73
TABLE 24
Timing of Subcycles: Actual minus Estimated Shoe Sales Compared with Selected Data,
1929—1941
MONTHS IN UNLIKE PHASE
ASOF ALL MONTHS a
Timing That
Syn- Maximizes
TIMING (months) chro- Correspondence
NUMBER OF MeanAveragenous Lead C—)
TURNS Lead (—)Devia-Timingor Lag (+)
All Matched bor Lag (+)tion (%) (months)(%)
(1)(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1. REFERENCE FRAME: ACTUAL MINUS ESTIMATED SHOE SALES (20 c
First differences: d
Shoe sales a 17 15 —0.8 1.9 80.5 0 305
Income payments:
Centered 18 13 +0.3 1.9 35.4 0 35.4
Plotted on Last month
(inverse) e 16 9 —1.6 2.9 59.0 —2 53.5
Factory payrolls h 21 16 —0.4 1.5 32.6 —1 30.5
Ratio of factory payrolls
to income payments'20 15 —0.7 1.2 31.2 —1 29,2
Factory man-hours 1 20 13 —0.2 1.4 36.1 —1 333
2. REFERENCE FRAME: FIRST DIFFERENCES IN SHOE SALES (17 TulIRs)
First differences: d
Income payments 18 17 —0.5 1.4 22.9 —1 21.5
Factory payrolls 21 17 —1.1 1.3 27.1 —1 22.2
Ratio of factory payrolls
to income payments 20 13 —0.8 1.1 31.2 —1 27.1
Factory man-hours 20 17 —0.7 1.8 29.9 —1 24.3
a SeeAppendix A, sec. 14.
b For the rules used in matching specific-subcycle turns to reference turns, see Appendix A,
sec. lOb.
cSalesestimated by income, time, and price (see Table 22, column 6).
C Centered five-month moving averages of month-to-month change for the series described in
the notes (except as indicated for one of the income payments series).
aShoesales are series 31 in Appendix B.
The series here used is an earlier (1944) revision of series 125 (revised 1947). Conclusions
given in the text apply equally to comparisons based on series 125.
gWhenthe association is inverse, specific peaks are matched to reference troughs and specific
troughs to reference peaks.
h Bureau of Labor Statistics index of factory payrolls, converted by the National Bureau of
Economic Research to an estimate of actual dollar payrolls, seasonally adjusted (series 127).
I Series 130.
I Based on seasonally adjusted National Industrial Conference Board indexes of factory man.
hours, 1921—1932, and BLS data on factory employment and average hours, 1932—1941 (series
129).
tion in which it has recently changed. People may
cut the purchase of a basic good less when income falls
by a given amount than they raise it when income rises
by the same amount, but such studies as have been
undertaken suggest that shoes would be a marginal
commodity in this respect. The time-series analysis
indicates that the income-change elasticity for shoes
is not far from zero, and more likely to be negative
than positive. Optimistic expectations about future in-
come, introspection suggests, may increase buying,
and pessimistic ones decrease it. But there is no in-
formation bearing on the association of shoe buying
and expectations in area surveys, and efforts to con-
trive a systematic representation of expectations that
could be used as a variable in regression analysis were
unsuccessful. (Changes in man-hours in manufncturing
shown in Chart 14 is one such attempt).
However, two major failures to reproduce actual
shoe sales on the basis of income, time, and price ap-
pear to reflect the impact in one case of pessimism
and in the other of optimism about future income. In
the first—the second half of 1931 and early
sales were substantially lower than our estimates as
Charts 12 and 13 show; sales of men's rath3r than
women's shoes seem chiefly responsible. These were
days of intense pessimism: banks were closing; prices of
all sorts were plummeting; and unemployment, under-
employment, and falling wages seemed to have come7. CHAPTER 6
CHART14
Error of EstimatingShoeSales by Three-Variable Equation
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Broken and solid vertical lines identify specific-subcycle peaks and troughs in dollar shoe
sales (Series 31 in Appendix B). For the other series, specific-subcycle turns are marked by 0.
The regression equation for actual minus estimated soles isin column 6 of Table 22. All
other series ore five-month moving averages of month-to-month change. For shoe soles, the
averages are centered; they are plotted on the fourth month for the payroll-income ratio
and on the fifth month for income and man-hours.
The scales have been adjusted to make comparison of fluctuations easier.
to stay.Certainly, it would be more surprising if mat-
tersofthis sort did not affect judgments about spend-
ingthanif they did.°5Inthe second case, optimism
25give the figures on the number of bank suspensions as
reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. They averaged 249 a
month for June 1931 through February 1932 as compared with
100 for the rest of 1932:
Jan.Feb.Mar.Apr.MayJune
1931 202 77 86 64 91 167
1932 342121 48 74 82 151
JulyAug.Sept.Oct.Nov.Dec.
1931 93158 305 522 175 358
1932 132 85 67 102 93 161
rather than pessimism may have been reflected in the
considerable excess of actual over estimated sales be-
tween January and May of 1936. The Adjusted Com-
pensation Act was passed in January and appropria-
tions in March. But it was not until June that bonds
could be cashed and receipts appear in income pay-
The disproportionate decline in buying relative to income pay-
ments seems visible in the other two departments selling men's
wear for which I have information—men's clothing and men's
furnishings—but not for the other departments. There is a sug-
gestion that total department-store sales show the siump, at least
faintly, and mail-order sales seem to do so quite clearly. Income
from agriculture slumped heavily also.
0
0
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ments. The figures suggest that spring wardrobes
might have been refurbished in anticipation of the
June bonanza.26
Expectations about prices might—if they were
strong and clear enough—cause consumers (like in-
dustrial buyers) to try to stock up before the rise.
There seems to be some suggestion in the unexplained
excess of actual over estimated sales that this may
have been the case on one occasion when very clear
expectations about rising prices must have prevailed—
the days of the President's Re-employment Agreement
and of the early National Recovery Administration
when much publicity was given to the fact that prices
would rise with rising wages and labor costs. Between
March and August 1933, actual shoe sales were higher
than those estimated by the regression equation, and
this was exactly the time that people may have rushed
to buy while prices were low. When prices did rise
abruptly in August and September, the spurt in buy-
ing turned to a deficiency. Indexes of sales of seven
departments of department stores seem to afford in-
teresting support for this explanation. The spurt of
buying in early 1933 tended to be systematically
larger relative to that in 1934 the larger the unit of
purchase for the department.27 This seems reasonable;
for people would presumably be more eager to achieve
a larger saving than a smaller one (the same per-
centage saving on an expensive item than on an in-
expensive one). In late 1941, expectation of rising
prices, but in this case of shortages too, may have
accounted for the underestimation of buying by the
regression equation.
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Budget studies suggest that shifts in income between
the relatively rich and poor or between farm and
urban population may well affect the amount of shoes
bought, other things the same. This would certainly
be the case if people responded to changes in income
in line with the patterns revealed for families in the
various income groups of the 1935—1936 area survey.
A combination of estimates based on that study with
figures on the share of income going to the top 5per
cent of income recipients, 1926 to 1941,28 indicated
that a trend increase of less than 0.3 per cent a year
in shoe buying may have resulted from the trend
toward equality of distribution, whereas short-term
26 It will be recalled that the income series used in the re-
gression distributes funds from cashed bonds over a series of
subsequent months, Thus the very large hump in income that
would otherwise have appeared in June is distributed over the
next half of the year.
27 See Mack, op. cit.,p. 63.
28 Simon Kuznets, Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income
and Savings, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1953.
shifts may have caused maximum increases or de-
creases of perhaps ±0.4 in a year. But these calcula-
tions are extremely hazardous. Unfortunately, they
cannot be buttressed by the introduction of appro-
priate variables into the multiple-regression schemes.
On the one hand, income-size distribution has been
subject to a trend toward greater equality, and this
factor in the net trend pattern cannot be isolated; on
the other hand, variation around the trend follows a
pattern too similar to that of many other eligible vari-
ables to be isolated.29
CONSUMERS' STOCKS OF SHOES
Another variable that may affect consumer buying
of shoes is the stock that they already possess. Of par-
ticular interest is the question of whether such hold-
ings may be at least partly responsible for the short
waves in shoe buying which the time series display
so prominently. From time to time in connection with
similar movements in the textile industry, a theory has
been put forward that the short cycles are primarily a
function of the intermediate life term of these semi-
durable goods.3° The articles last a year or a year
and a half, and the short swings in business last, on
the average, about the same period; the wearing out
and consequent need for renewal is thought to cause
an initial wave in buying to echo in subsequent
waves.3' This question turns out to be an extremely
complicated one to which the answer finally achieved
in the technical paper is altogether inconclusive. The
impact of stock on buying has three aspects, other
things the same—the inverse impact of stocks (the
more people own, the less their current need), the
direct impact of replacement needs (the more people
own and use, the more is worn out currently), and
the direct impact of stock objectives (the more people
and their friends and neighbors have, the more they
want).
It is possible on the basis of assumptions about the
29 For annual data, payroll income and other income were
used separately, but the income elasticity of the former was
found to be lower (rather than higher) than that of the latter. In
the monthly analysis, first differences in the ratio of payrolls to
income were used as a variable in addition to income proper. The
variable carried the correct sign in the regression but was sta-
tistically insignificant. Its course is plotted in Chart 14 and its
correspondence to the unexplained residuals measured in Table
24.
3° See Norman J.Silberling, The Dynamics of Business,
McGraw-Hill, 1943, Chapter 19; George F. Warren aiid Frank
A. Pearson, World Prices and the Building Industry, Wiley,
1987, Chapter 8, especially p. 165; and T. M. McNiece, "The
Economic Significance of Replacement Cycles in Demand,"
Transactians of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers,
May 1934, pp. 337—353.
the goods last just one year, as when they are always
renewed in a given month, a tendency toward echo waves
would be largely removed by the seasonal correction.76 CHAPTER 6
life term and patterns of depreciation of shoes to con-
struct hypothetical time series for each of these in-
fluences with the aid of statistics on shoe sales. But es-
pecially for replacement needs, the pattern is very sensi-
tive indeed to the particular assumptions made. Do
shoes, for example, inspire replacement abruptly at
the end of a fixed period or do they do so gradually
as their usefulness decreases? What is the precise pat-
tern, and how immutable is it? But even if we could
determine the actual pattern of each of the three in-
fluences, it is impossible to decide a priori concern-
ing their relative importance, nor can the question be
answered by empirical study. So in the end, the com-
plicated analysis yields no firm hypothesis or method
of selecting one.
One thing seems clear: the minor waves in buying
are not primarily a function of the typical life span
of shoes, for they occur at the same time in commodi-
ties that last a month, a year, or half a decade. This is
apparent in monthly statistics for seven departments
of department stores, as well as in other retail sta-
tistics. On the other hand, the evidence is not incon-
sistent with the hypothesis that minor movements in
shoes are stronger relative to those in income pay-
ments than is the case for major ones, and this may or
may not be true for commodities of greater durability;
we do not know. It is possible that this phenomenon
for shoe buying may be explained by the influence of
stock; if so, it seems more likely to be a function of
the inverse impact of stock on the major swings in
buying than of the direct influence of the replacement
echo effect on minor ones. For if shoes are assumed to
have a useful life of around nine to eighteen months,
stocks would reproduce the major swings in buying
but bridge, and consequently lose, the minor ones;
their inverse impact on current buying would there-
fore damp the major but not the minor swings. Re-
placement would only cause short waves if it followed
substantially a sudden-death rather than a gradual
depreciation formula. Even then the replacement
waves would appear in current buying with a pattern
which, as far as one can judge, the minor waves do
not seem to show.
CHANCES IN THE PRODUCr
We have been speaking of the impact on the buying
of shoes of the broad facts of the environment in
which people live. But the businessmen who supply
shoes spend their days trying to hold or attract con-
sumer dollars. Do they succeed merely in attracting
them from one another, or do they manage to coax
them away from dress or from automobile manu-
facturers, or even from life insurance companies or
other depositories of savings?
The downward trend in shoe buying, other things
the same, in part expresses the difficulty any one
commodity has in maintaining its grip on the con-
sumer dollar in the face of the ever-increasing number
of new utilities and needs that men devise. But we
saw in Chapter 5 that sales of women's shoes stood
up a great deal better than sales of men's shoes, and
it seems likely that the added appeal of style in
women's shoes at an attractive price has slowed the
pace of decline in aggregate shoe buying. Later chap-
ters raise a question concerning the impact on funda-
mental operating problems in the shoe and leather
industry of this increased emphasis on style, a trend
found in a great many different sorts of industries.
Are short fluctuations in production (rather than in
consumption) of shoes emphasized in a business en-
vironment in which "high-style" goods are made and
sold?
In addition to this trend, there is a hint, in the dif-
ference between the estimated and actual shoe sales,
of one period when unusual developments in the field
of style may possibly have raised aggregate shoe sales
relative to what they otherwise would have been. Near
the close of 1938, total shoe sales and most of the
components of the shoe-sales index were high, par-
ticularly women's shoe sales. Other retail sales data,
however, seem typically to show a bulge more nearly
proportional to that of income payments. The picture
points to a style event in women's shoes capable of
really stimulating consumer interest.I have asked
several people in the industry whether they knew of
any such occasion in the dozen or so years preceding
World War II. They seemed to agree that the fall of
1938 was such a time.32 But even if shoes did exert
some special magnetism on the income dollar during
32 The sling-back pump became a mass consumption item in
1938, though it had been introduced much earlier; this is
the time when the "loafer" shoe, introduced originally from
Sweden via Bermuda, became an important selling item in the
United States. The Sears Roebuck catalogue of 1938 also speaks
of the "success story" of the saddle oxford "rediscovered" by
the college girl;it was featured in a half-page spread in the
fall catalogue. Other style trends (enumerated of course inde-
pendently of any question about a specific year) were believed
to constitute an exceptional stimulus to sales in the winter of
1938 to 1939—the round-toed "baby-doll" shoe, platform con-
struction, and the lower heel.
These stories are supported by the fact that the movement
was more marked in the retail sales of women's than in those
of men's shoes. Production statistics, though they bear a pretty
fuzzy relation to sales, also add assent: production of all shoes
was about 7 per cent lower between August 1938 and July 1939
than for the other twelve months of these two years; production
of women's shoes was about 2.5 per cent lower and of misses'
and children's shoes 8.5 per cent higher.CAUSES OF CONSUMER BUYING 77
this period, this probably afforded only a part of the
total
Evaluation
These investigations yield both quantitative and
qualitative insights into changes in consumer shoe
buying and the factors that determine them for the
period studied. We saw the overpowering influence
of consumer income (together with whatever else
paralleled its course) in explaining the history of shoe
buying between 1929 and 1941. When the net down-
ward trend contributed by a variety of factors—per-
haps including the reaction to relative shoe prices—
TABLE 25
was added, a very substantial part of total shoe buying
for the dozen or more years preceding World War II
was "explained."
The rather surprising success in explaining most of
the course of shoe buying, 1929 to 1941, on the basis
of income, trend, and relative price is no more in-
formative than the failures to explain the rest. For
there is reason to believe that failures cannot be at-
tributed to inadequacies in the shoe-sales index itself,
nor do they seem to be scattered at random. They are
of several sorts.
First, the estimating equation that gives such good
results for the prewar years gives bad ones for 1946—
1950, as Table 25 shows. In view of the poor estima-
tion of change, I am quite unimpressed by the fact
that the broad level of shoe sales (the 1948 estimates
were very close indeed to actual sales) was so well
The explanation applies to the shoes worn by women and
older girls. Assuming that these constitute about 60 per cent
of shoe sales, the error for the eight months between September
1938 and April 1989 amounted to almost 5 per cent of this
60 per cent share of shoe sales for the same period. This strikes
me as rather more stimulation than seems likely, though it is
certainly not impossible.
reproduced by our formula, in spite of a virtual dou-
bling of sales during the war. Whether the estimates
are made in current or deflated dollars, per capita or
aggregate, the 1929—1941 relationship when projected
to later years overestimates shoe sales during the war,
underestimates them for several years afterwards, and
returns to almost the actual figure in 1948. This picture
could be explained in terms of impoverishment of se-
lections and rationing during the war with make-up
buying afterward. But whether this is an important
part of the explanation and what other factors are
also involved need examination preceded by far more
careful attention than I have given to the estimates of
postwar shoe sales, prices, and the like.
For, the whole tenor of our work has emphasized the
fact that shoe buying, and I have no doubt the buying
of most other commodities, too, is substantially influ-
enced by aspects of the environment thatare not at all
likely to remain unaffected by changes in theecon-
omy such as those accompanying a war. There were
changes in what the industry supplied, in competing
products, and in the rate at which populationgrew;
during the war, income distribution departed radically
from its trend of the thirties; therewere marked
changes in the relationship among prices of major
commodity groups and between shoes and the cost of
living (relative shoe prices rose considerably); the
buying power of current income was augmented by
huge accumulations of personal savings; consumers'
stocks of shoes, as well as of other commodities,were
depleted. What effect would these changes haveon
the downward trend in shoe buying, on the propensity
to consume shoes, and, finally, on the force of the
impact of the several other factors, some of which
could not be isolated for the prewar period but might,
because of their greater range of fluctuation, beap-
parent flow?
Actual and Estimated Shoe Sales and Their Change, by Years, 1946—1950
(dollars in millions)






















1947 3,155.0 2,817.8 +837.2+$147,8 1+$260.63 —$112.8
1948 3,147.0 3,128.6 +18.4 —8.0 8+310.8 1 —318.8
1949 3,013.7 3,071.3 —57.6 —133.34 —57.34 —76.0
1950 3,138.8 3,841.3 —202.5 +125.12+270.02 —144.9
a Series 31 in Appendix B.
b Estimated by income, time, and price (see Table 22, column 6).78 CHAPTER6
A second sort of failure is the inability to estimate
some of the amplitude of the short waves in shoe buy-
ing. A variety of information suggests several ways in
which these minor fluctuations may come about and
yet fail to be quantitatively reflected in the data that
can be used to explain shoe buying. Two sorts of de-
ficiencies in the estimates would result, and both are
apparent in the statistics: first, a systematic tendency to
lose some of the response of buying to a group of fac-
tors likely to have a significant short-term impact (or
at least aspect of their impact) on buying—rates of
change in income, shifts in income distribution, in
expectations, and in holdings of shoes; second, spo-
radic failures to account for buying at particular times
when some special set of factors is unusually influ-
ential.
Yet interestingly enough, sifting down both
success and failure in these efforts to explain con-
sumer shoe buying is the impression of the remark-
able rationality and stability of aggregate consumer
behavior, even with respect to the purchasing of this
single commodity. The difficulty in' describing its ra-
tionale lies in our power to isolate the great variety
of factors—a quite reasonable variety—that determine
its major contours. Isolation by means of the mathe-
matics of correlation analysis of aggregate figures,
averaged for income groups or for long periods of time,
isa poor half-way answer. Monthly data make a
sharper statement than blunt annual statistics, but
are not enough. To improve the answer we need to
capitalize on differences between periods of time,
among individual families, among groups of families
that have been selected to expose some variables and
suppress others. Nevertheless, for the particular period
we have studied, these methods would embroider
rather than alter the basic finding: the great changes
that took place in the money that people currently
received caused of necessity parallel changes in what
they spent on anything and everything;